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A B S T R A C T
In this special issue, work is presented linking metacognition among persons with schizophrenia with a range of
psychosocial outcomes including vocational functioning, empathy, motivation, self-evaluation, and other cog-
nitive functions. This overview will highlight how these works allow for the quantitative study of processes
which underpin alterations in self-experience in schizophrenia, which in turn allows self-experience to be stu-
died as part of a larger set of brain-based and social phenomena whose interaction influences the trajectory of
one's life and illness. We explore the hypothesis that metacognitive capacity, as a node in a larger biopsycho-
social network, may be accessible by psychosocial treatment and, if successfully targeted, may disrupt the
processes which perpetuate disability. Limitations and directions for future research are also discussed.
1. Why metacognition matters as an emerging concept in
schizophrenia research
Work in the allied fields of mental health and rehabilitation has
increasingly recognized that recovery from most complex mental health
challenges requires activities which are metacognitive in nature
(Lysaker et al., 2018a). For example, the metacognitive processes that
enable persons to form integrated ideas about themselves and others
within the flow of their lives (Moritz and Lysaker, 2018) seem essential
when any individual has to decide how to make sense of the challenges
posed by the alterations in thought, emotion, personality, or social
opportunity, which may come with mental health challenges. Similarly,
the metacognitive capacity which underlies the ability to notice and
reflect upon experience would similarly seem necessary for a person to
collaborate with others and find a way to sustain meaningful connec-
tion within one's community.
Metacognitive processes have been consequently suggested to be
essential for recovery, regardless of the ultimate causes of the mental
health challenges (Lysaker and Klion, 2017). Whether compromises in
mental health are primarily the result of environmental and social
factors (e.g. stigma, poverty, trauma, or social alienation), biological
factors (e.g. disruptions in basic brain function), or a complex inter-
action between these factors, recovery may require that the person form
an idea of those challenges and how they should be dealt with or
managed (Leonhardt et al., 2017). Self-management and sustained
wellness thus require not just knowledge about psychiatric and social
challenges, but also awareness of the experience and thoughts of others,
one's strengths, personal history, and values. Recovery thus requires the
integration of that information into a meaningful sense of what is
happening in one's life, which can be the basis for reflection and action.
Specifically, persons must make sense of what has been uniquely in-
terrupted within their own life, how it was interrupted, and what that
experience means to them. What has the person uniquely lost, and for
what should the person hope? In light of this, how should a person
continue to pursue a meaningful life?
2. Metacognition, function, and recovery in schizophrenia
The papers in this special issue explore metacognition in schizo-
phrenia, as decreased metacognitive capacity may be a core feature of
this illness and a significant barrier to recovery. The works in this issue
therefore offer opportunities for scientific advances including the
identification of phenomena, perhaps previously invisible or at least
neglected, which, when disrupted, may lie at the root of continuous
suffering and dysfunction. In a review of cross-cultural work on meta-
cognition by Lysaker et al. (2019c), detailed evidence is laid out that
metacognitive deficits can be broadly detected in psychosis and act as a
proximal moderator of the effects of other social and biological
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functions on function. These findings are suggested to be consistent
with Bleuler's (1950) original model of schizophrenia and have inspired
efforts to develop metacognitively oriented integrative psy-
chotherapies, such as Metacognitive Reflection and Insight Therapy
(MERIT; Lysaker and Klion, 2017). Wright et al. (2019) offer a richer
sense of how metacognition is related to highly specific aspects of vo-
cational function in first-episode psychosis, while Bonfils et al. (2019)
examine how metacognition is related to empathy in a novel experi-
mental task. Luther et al. (2019) explore the relationship of intrinsic
motivation with metacognitive function, while Jones et al. (2019) focus
on the real-life consequences of congruence of self-appraisal and the
appraisal of others. Finally, in one of the first longitudinal studies of its
kind, Kukla and Lysaker (2019) document how changes in metacogni-
tive function over time are linked with changes in other phenomena,
including neurocognition and social cognition.
These works taken together point to an even broader set of scientific
as well as humanistic issues. First, this body of work provides meth-
odologies for the quantitative exploration of how alterations in self-
experience are a key aspect of complex mental health conditions,
without reducing self-experience to either the status of an epipheno-
menon or casting the self as something which in dualistic terms is
distinct and unrelated to the body. Practically, this allows for a way to
see persons diagnosed with schizophrenia and other major mental
health conditions as whole persons who actively experience and con-
front, rather than passively endure, some of the most perplexing forms
of psychological and emotional suffering. Second, from a more re-
search-oriented view, this body of work allows us to potentially situate
metacognition as a node in the complex social and biological network,
whose parts interact to generate a range of possible outcomes. This
network perspective may provide a glimpse of how metacognition,
biological, social, and phenomenological variables influence one an-
other within the course of a unique life trajectory. As a whole, these
papers offer a more nuanced view of the concept of disability and the
tasks facing recovery-oriented treatment. We will now discuss each of
these issues in a broader sense and then turn to directions for future
research.
3. A path to the quantitative study of alterations in self-experience
in psychopathology
The papers presented in this issue broadly offer quantitative ap-
proaches that may surmount previous barriers to the scientific ex-
amination of the vicissitudes in self-experience in complex mental
health conditions. Qualitative, quantitative, and clinical research, as
well as first-person reports, have indicated that many individuals di-
agnosed with schizophrenia have significant changes in self-experience
(Lysaker and Lysaker, 2010). These alterations include loss of agency
and loss of the cohesiveness of one's personal identity (McCarthy-Jones
et al., 2013). They cannot be reduced to the side effects of symptoms,
and they are for many a key aspect of the experience of schizophrenia
(Hamm et al., 2018; Leonhardt et al., 2017). Despite calls for over two
decades to consider these alterations in self-experience as core aspects
of in schizophrenia (Esteroff, 1989; Roe, 2001), there have been many
challenges to understanding them as they occur in the midst of other
aspects of the disorder.
One of the barriers to understanding how alterations in self-ex-
perience fits into a larger picture concerns the nature of self-experience
itself. Self-experience is immediate, intimate, continuous, and yet elu-
sive. We do not experience the self in ways that are similar to how we
experience things in the world. For example, the self is not something
we can observe by virtue of its location in space or the qualities it shares
with objects. William James, among the first psychologists to think
systematically about this concept, proposed that self-experience is our
experience of ourselves as we encounter the world. We do not just ex-
perience the world. We experience ourselves experiencing the world.
We interpret and respond to the world and can experience ourselves
making those interpretations and responses.
It is thus naturally difficult to characterize what underlies altera-
tions in this process. Self-experience is so instantaneous that we often
do not notice it in the midst of our encounters with things, people, and
situations in the world. So what does it mean when we notice that
something about our self or our self-experience has changed? What does
it mean when persons with schizophrenia can no longer, in essence, find
themselves as they experience the world? What happens when someone
perceives that their self-experience has changed or been diminished?
Certainly, the identity of one person can never be the same as another;
thus, how could there be common changes in self-experience?
Mirroring dualistic theories of the mind, which divide the mind
from body, it has been tempting for many to think that the self is
something distinct from other neurobiological processes or that al-
terations in self-experience reflect the self as having become detached
from the person whose identity it define. But if this approach is taken,
there is nothing measurable to underpin changes in self-experience.
Changes in self-experience stand on their own. They are axiomatically
unrelated to other phenomenon. Aspects of this approach seem to have
persisted in part and have been suggested (Lysaker et al., 2012) to
underlie various theories, ranging from Kraepelin's original idea of the
mind in schizophrenia as an orchestra missing a conductor to phe-
nomenological models of schizophrenia, which suggest that it involves
a disturbance of basic or minimal self (ipseity) (e.g. Nelson et al., 2014).
These potentially dualistically-rooted approaches often involve assess-
ments of the strangeness of self-experience (Sass et al., 2018) and the
lack or oddness of experience is merely what it is and nothing more can
be said about it. These views have consequently been suggested to fail
to offer an understanding of how these experiences can be altered at a
particular point and then later recovered as well as how intimately they
are linked to emotional pain (Hamm et al., 2015; Lysaker et al., 2018b).
These approaches have also been criticized for not lending themselves
to testing whether altered self-experience fits into a complex network of
interacting discernable psychological, social and biological features
(Hamm et al., 2018).
We suggest that research on metacognition presented in the special
issue may help the field go beyond dualistic approaches to under-
standing alterations in self-experience. Specifically, the methodologies
which underlie and inform what is referred to as the integrated model
of metacognition (Lysaker et al., 2019d) allow that alterations in self-
experience are not a matter of the loss of something internal. In the
integrative model of metacognition, metacognition refers to the auto-
matic and effortful process which allow embodied, cognitive, and
emotional experiences within the flow of life to be pieced together into
a broader and holistic sense of oneself and others. Thus, metacognitive
deficits only allow for only a fragmented sense of self to be available in
the moment. Measurable deficits in metacognitive capacity leave per-
sons, in particularly contextualized moments, without the ability to
produce complex, evolving, and integrated senses of themselves and
possibilities for future action. It is not merely strange or disembodied
experience separate from the rest of the person that is at issue but the
collapse of a measurable capacity. This capacity can be empirically
studied and also represents something which when recovered, can re-
verse alterations in self-experience.
4. Metacognition as a central node in larger social and
psychological networks of schizophrenia
One of the first major implications of this work is that we now have
processes intimately connected to self-experience whose relationship to
other social and biological processes can be measured. This could
permit greater understanding of findings that schizophrenia reflects a
range of different causal factors, clinical presentations, and outcomes
(e.g. Radua et al., 2018). Consistent with Bleuler's (1950) suggestion
that the fragmentation of experience of thoughts, emotions, and desires
explained clinical heterogeneity, the integrated model of metacognition
P.H. Lysaker, et al. Schizophrenia Research: Cognition 19 (2020) 100167
2
allows us to explore how metacognitive deficits interact with neuro-
biological, clinical, and social phenomena.
One way to study these complex relationships is with network
analysis. In this emerging field, a network is defined by a series of
discrete elements, which have varying patterns of connections with one
another. In network analysis, elements are conceptualized as nodes and
connections as the edges of the network (Costantini et al., 2015;
Epskamp et al., 2018). Rather than a simple causal model in which one
event affects another, network analysis enables a visualization of how
different factors continuously affect one another in a manner roughly
analogous to an electronic circuit. Applied to mental health conditions,
networks have been used to examine the mutual effects of different
problems or challenges (Fried et al., 2017). In a network, a node is
important not necessarily because of its influence on another specific
node, but because it connects more nodes with one other.
Following the integrated model of metacognition, different causal
factors, clinical presentations, and outcomes might be seen as part of a
network connected through disturbance in metacognition. With a
backdrop of previous work linking metacognition with clinical phe-
nomena, including negative symptoms and alterations in basic brain
function (Lysaker et al., 2019c), the papers in this special issue suggest
that metacognition is a node related to complex outcomes including
work function (Wright et al., 2019), psychosocial adaptation (Jones
et al., 2019), empathy (Bonfils et al., 2019), and motivation (Luther
et al., 2019). The potential of metacognition as a central node is also
supported by links between metacognition and cognitive phenomena
thought to be related to both outcome and biological functions at
multiple levels – of the cell, neurotransmitters and the ongoing inter-
action of brain regions (Kahn et al., 2015).
The possibility then arises from this view that compromises in me-
tacognition, while perhaps neither a key cause of the condition nor a
key psychosocial outcome, may be a key piece of the puzzle in under-
standing schizophrenia because they are a central node in the network;
they connect biological activity with consciousness, meaningful con-
nection, and participation in the community. Indeed, in light of initial
analyses which have shown a complex network including symptom and
function outcomes (e.g. Galderisi et al., 2018), the studies within this
special issue offer metacognition as a key node or even a substrate,
which connects and allows for the continuous interaction among these
phenomena. Thus, differing levels of metacognition may in part explain
why distal connections between biological, social, and phenomen-
ological outcomes are not so robust. Following similar work on resi-
lience (Galderisi et al., 2018), studying metacognition as a node in an
interconnected network may help us understand how people diagnosed
with schizophrenia meet challenges in such diverse ways.
As a simple example, in the path from symptoms to motivation to
job tenure, the relationship of symptoms and motivation may likely be
affected by the kind of sense people make of symptoms and their de-
cisions about how to respond to them. This pathway may also affect job
tenure; reciprocally, job tenure can then affect symptoms, all the while
the person's understanding and response to challenges also affects their
motivation.
Illustrating the potential of the network approach for understanding
the role of metacognition, Cella et al. (2015) have argued that previous
models suggesting links between neurocognitive abilities - including
flexibility, planning, and memory - and work function may be enhanced
by adding metacognition as a variable not only affected by cognitive
phenomena but which also directly affects work function, creating a
feedback loop. As another illustration of this possibility, Hasson-
Ohayon et al. (2018) recently conducted a network analysis that in-
cluded five domains of symptoms, six domains of neurocognition, and
multiple aspects of both social cognition and metacognition. Findings
indicated that metacognitive self-reflection, along with cognitive dis-
organization, were the variables that most often connected other vari-
ables to one another, suggesting both were the central hubs of the
network.
5. Clinical implications
The view of metacognition in schizophrenia as a measurable way to
study alterations in self-experience and as a central node in a network
of behaviors, emotion, and cognition has several immediate and prac-
tical implications. Foremost, if metacognition represents a proximal
cause of disability, it may offer a relatively accessible treatment target.
Regardless of whether they are an initial cause of dysfunction, the
amelioration of metacognitive deficits may interrupt or alter the re-
lationship that exists within the larger network of social and biological
variables. The treatment of metacognitive deficits may alter the systems
which sustain disability, resulting in improvements in causal factors,
without addressing those causes directly. For example, it is conceivable
that, with greater capacity to form and evolve an integrated sense of self
and others, persons might be able to make sense of the trauma that
precipitated psychosis - or the trauma of psychosis itself. With greater
capacity to form and evolve an integrated sense of self and others,
persons might similarly be able to make sense of anomalous experiences
characteristic of Schneiderian first rank symptoms. With enhanced
metacognitive capacity, they might become better able to manage dif-
ficulties they experience when trying to respond to complex social si-
tuations. If making sense of experience is a key aspect of membership in
the human community, even persons with severe disturbances in
thoughts, emotions and behavior who develop their metacognitive ca-
pacities may become better able to see themselves as part of larger
social structures, as well as combat stigma which restricts community
membership (Lysaker et al., 2019b).
Importantly, positioning metacognition as a treatment target does
not necessitate the creation of a new set of interventions. In addition to
new treatments being developed that specifically target metacognition,
including MERIT (Lysaker and Klion, 2017), a range of empirically
validated interventions exist that lead to desirable outcomes, such as
enhanced work function, social support, self-compassion, and reduc-
tions in symptoms, stigma or distress (Ascone et al., 2017; Bredemeier
et al., 2018; Yanos et al., in press). The view of metacognition as a
central node in a network of psychosocial phenomena suggests that
some existing treatments may exert their effect via their impact on
metacognitive capacity. For example, Cella et al. (2015) suggested that
cognitive remediation may affect work function through its effects on
metacognition, which opens up sustainable feedback between work,
flexibility, planning and memory. Bredemeier et al. (2018) have also
recently pointed to a bi-directional feedback relationship between self-
reflection (an element of metacognition) and neurocognition in a nat-
uralistic and recovery-oriented treatment trial. Moritz et al. (2018)
make a similar point that exercises designed to combat reasoning bias
may also impact health when they enhance the capacity for self-re-
flection in the world. Others have suggested that diverse approaches,
including psychodynamic and humanistic psychotherapy, might also
promote health via their effects on metacognition (Knauss et al., 2018;
Lysaker et al., 2019a).
Concretely, what is suggested here is that a range of interventions
affect outcome when they also affect how readily persons form complex
and integrated ideas of themselves within the flow of life. Interventions
which target beliefs, symptoms, or skills seem to “work,” yet it may be
that they work when they help persons diagnosed with schizophrenia to
piece together immediate and past experience as a whole person, decide
what they think has gone well, and what has gone poorly, and then
decide how to manage this. They might also “not work” when they
inadvertently think for people or coach them to accept others' pre-
formed ideas. Cognitive remediation and cognitive therapy, as well as
the older psychotherapeutic approaches suggested above, may not only
affect isolated skills but help persons think more flexibly and positively,
and form a richer and less fragmented sense of self. Perhaps with en-
hanced cognitive abilities and a solid therapeutic alliance, persons may
become better able to recognize and pursue what they want from
themselves, others and life in general (Hamm and Lysaker, 2018).
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6. Conclusions and future directions
In summary, this special issue presents a range of papers that speak
to the potential to measure core processes which underlie the continuity
and coherence of self-experience in schizophrenia. Results support the
hypothesis that metacognition may play a relatively central role in the
interacting network of biological, social and psychological phenomena.
This work provides another piece of evidence that interventions which
enhance metacognitive capacity may enable persons with schizo-
phrenia to move towards recovery by assisting them to make personally
meaningful sense of their psychosocial challenges, to recognize their
strengths and abilities, and use that knowledge to effectively manage
their lives.
There are limitations to note. Most studies were cross-sectional and
relatively modest in size. Studies also used single assessments of key
constructs. The work thus is clearly in its early stages, and future re-
search is needed. Work is required with more diverse samples including
persons who refuse treatment and persons in developing countries in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Longitudinal studies are required
which measure multiple outcomes over longer periods of time. The
exact relationship of broader assessments of metacognition with more
focused assessments of cognitive judgments (Gould et al., 2015) is
poorly understood, and research and theoretical work is needed to
understand how these methods overlap and diverge. As noted by
Lysaker et al. (2018b), considerable work is needed to understand how
effortful and automatic processes, as well as cognitive and embodied
experiences, complement one another in consciousness and come to-
gether to allow a sense of self and others to be available in the flow of
life. Work also is lacking exploring the linkage of metacognitive func-
tions with the basic brain activities which support key aspects of in-
trospection (Pinkham et al., 2018). Deficits in metacognition are also
considered regardless of their causality; work is needed to determine
whether metacognitive deficits, for example those primarily linked to
trauma versus those linked to neurocognitive compromise, are indeed
equivalent. Extensive testing of the potential metacognitive mechan-
isms of various treatments, including those designed to target meta-
cognition (e.g. Lysaker and Klion, 2017) are needed to confirm these
hypotheses.
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